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We examine to what extent the popularity of an investment style can be attributed to style 
investing. The style investing hypothesis predicts that assets in the same style show 
strong comovement with respect to their underlying fundamentals and that reclassifying 
assets into a new style raises its correlation with that style. We test this prediction by 
studying how comovement varies with proxies of popularity. We use different kinds of 
data, such as data on stocks, mutual funds, IPO’s and financial analysts. We provide 
strong evidence that when popularity of a style is high investors base their demand for 
stocks on an individual stock level. We also find that style popularity is positively related 
to style performance. The evidence presented here challenges the view that investors base 
their asset allocation on a style level instead of an individual stock level.  
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1  Introduction 
 
In this paper we link style investing to style popularity. Style investing has become an 
important  issue  for  institutional  as  well  as  for  private  investors.  Many  institutional 
investors claim to follow a particular investment strategy, such as ‘value’ or ‘small-cap’. 
Investment  strategies  are  often  classified in  terms  of  a  specific  style.  A  style can  be 
defined as a classification of assets into a category based on common characteristics. 
Given frequent references to such categories in the media, it is likely  that individual 
investors adopt and use this terminology for their own investing purposes. Meanwhile, 
the financial services industry has also responded to this terminology. For example, labels 
such as value and technology, are frequently used to reflect the objective of mutual funds. 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) develop a model that explains the impact of style investing 
on financial markets and security valuation. They combine style-based portfolio selection 
with a mechanism how investors choose among styles. In the model there are two kind of 
investors, fundamental traders and switchers. The fundamental traders act as arbitrageurs 
that try to prevent the price of each asset to deviate too far from its fundamental value. 
The  investment  policy  of  switchers  is  determined  by  two  distinctive  characteristics. 
Firstly, switchers classify assets into categories where they give each category a label. In 
this way switchers try to simplify the information processing by making their decisions 
on  a  category  level  rather  than  an  individual  asset  level.  Secondly,  the  choice  for  a 
particular style is dependent on the relative past performance. Good fundamental news 
about the securities in a style is responsible for a style getting popular.  
A consequence of style investing is the emergence of life cycles of investment 
styles.  When  a  style  had  a  good  past  performance  relative  to  other  styles,  switchers 
allocate to that style and withdraw resources from other styles. If the style matures, good 
past  performance  is  important  to  add  new  resources  to  a  style.  The  style  loses  its 
popularity  when bad news arrives or when arbitrage levels out excess  returns. These 
investment cycles show close resemblance with the fashion cycles as described by Shiller 
(2000).  
Barberis  and  Shleifer  (2003)  hypothesize  that  as  a  consequence  of  investors 
applying style investing, comovement in prices (and returns) of styles is induced. Cornell 
(2004) illustrates this with an example. He shows that labeling increases the chance for 
investors to make errors when they allocate funds at the level of categories. Companies 
with different business activities might be linked to the same category. He illustrates this 
with two Internet companies, Yahoo and Amazon. At the start of the internet bubble the 
correlation  between  the  price  changes  of  two  stocks  was  low  (0.10).  After  that,  the         
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correlation between the returns started to grow to more than 0.80, and stayed above the 
level  of  0.70  for  three  quarters.  At  the  end  it  decreased  to  0.30.  Looking  at  the 
fundamentals of both companies it was not clear why these two firms should be highly 
correlated.  Cornell  suggests  that  the  temporary  popularity  of  the  label  ‘internet’  has 
caused  investors  to  temporarily  consider  the  two  stocks  as  equivalent  investment 
opportunities. Kumar (2002) studies the relation between style-based investing and stock 
returns.  He divides  stocks  into opposite  styles,  value  versus  growth and large  versus 
small. He uses data on the portfolio composition of the clients from a large discount 
brokerage house in the US and recommendations of investment newsletters from Hulbert 
Financial Digest. He finds evidence that individual investors formulate their demands at a 
style level and re-allocate funds between styles on the basis of past relative performance 
as well as ‘expert advice’ from investment newsletters.  
Pomorski  (2004)  examines  the  relation  between  mutual  fund  flows  and  style 
attractiveness. He finds that flows are positively related to past returns and negatively 
related  to  returns  of  competing  styles.  However,  at  the  individual  level  the  pattern 
disappears. If a fund does well when its style underperforms, the flow of that fund will be 
negatively related to the past performance of its style. The results support the hypothesis 
that investors evaluate fund managers both at a style-level and at a fund-level. We find 
that the popularity of stocks is stock-specific and not dependent on the investment style 
that the stocks belong to. In addition, we find a size-effect for stocks within styles that are 
not popular and no size-effect for the popular style stocks. When styles are less popular, 
the quintile with largest stocks has lower dispersion than the quintile with the smallest 
stocks. The evidence presented here challenges the view that investors base their asset 
allocation on a style level instead of an individual stock level. These results support the 
findings of Pomorski (2004) and contradict empirical work by Kumar (2002), Froot and 
Teo (2004), Cornell (2004) and Huang (2005). The style investing hypothesis implies that 
the inflow of resources should be positively related with style popularity. It is likely that 
style popularity is related to past returns. The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and 
Tversky,  1974)  implies  that  investors  extrapolate  past  performance  and  therefore 
investors believe that styles that performed well in the past will continue to do that in the 
future.  Popularity  should  therefore  be  positively  related  to  past  returns.  Our  findings 
confirm that popularity is related to good past performance. These results fit closely with 
the findings of Pomorski (2004),Kumar (2002), Froot and Teo (2004) and Huang (2005).  
We also perform some robustness checks to show the life cycles of popularity 
(which can be compared to the life cycles described by Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). In 
addition,  we  perform  a  regression  to  test  whether  the  movement  in  popularity  of  a         
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particular style leads to comovement in returns between stocks in that style. Our findings 
show that an increase in popularity leads to a decrease in correlations in returns between 
stocks in the same style.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  the  next  section  we  discuss 
fashion in the context of investing. The reason is that popularity is closely related to 
fashion. First, popularity may be induced by fashion. Second, fashion and popularity both 
reflect the collective preferences of individuals and the changes of such preferences over 
time.  In section 3 we describe several variables that measure popularity. In section 4 we 
present the methodology to form a popularity index and in section 5 we discuss the data 
and style description. In section 6, we interpret and discuss the results. This is followed 
with a robustness test in section 7. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in section 8. 
 
2  Fashion 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the objective of this chapter is to investigate to 
what extent stock popularity can be attributed to style investing. Fashion may play an 
important role in the existence of stock popularity. Fashion can be defined as a collective 
preference that develops through social processes, where the need of identity and the 
social network are important determinants for market dynamics. In the absence of data on 
social interaction, fashion is closely related to popularity in the way that it both reflects 
the collective preferences of individuals and the changes of such preferences over time. 
In this section, we give a brief overview of fashion and show why it might be important 
for the decision-making process of investors.  
Investing is described in the literature as a process of individuals who choose 
based on their own opinions about risk characteristics and their prospects of returns rather 
than on other people’s opinion. Then it is less likely that investing should be vulnerable 
to fashions. However because fashions appear in many areas such as clothes, politics and 
health,  it  also  is  plausible  that  the  fluctuations  in  fashion  appear  in  the  investment 
industry.  The  changes  in  attitude  often  occur  widely  in  the  population  without  any 
predictable  reason.  It  is  very  plausible  that  fashions  in  investments  also  change 
spontaneously or as a social reaction to some event. 
Although we may be inclined to view movements in fashion in cyclical terms, it is also 
possible to view fashion in terms of permanent changes in collective behavior. As argued 
by Veblen (1899), changes in fashion are the result of a dynamic social process, where 
individuals are looking for ways to distinguish themselves from the large majority where 
the  large  majority  is  trying  to  copy  the  distinct  group  of  innovative  individuals.  In         
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Freeman’s (1994) view, fashion has a productive side, since it facilitates a cheap way of 
introducing innovative productive behavior. In terms of the investment industry, a new 
innovative way of investing can be used by a small group of elite investors, who use this 
investment as status enhancing. After a while, others try to copy this strategy. Eventually, 
this leads to the adoption of an asset class by a large group of investors. A recent example 
of such a transmission of a new way of investing is the emergence of hedge funds. Hedge 
funds, in their early stages, were offered to a small minority of investors. The official 
(most quoted) starting point of hedge funds was in 1949. A. Jones started an equity fund 
that was organized to provide flexibility in constructing a portfolio (he took long and 
short  positions  and  used  leverage  to  enhance  his  performance).  Many  hedge  funds 
perished during the market downturns, 1969-1970, and 1973-1974. After 1974, hedge 
funds lost their popularity until the mid-1980s. In 1980, there were 30 hedge funds with 
an asset value of $193 million. During the 1990s, hedge funds became more accessible to 
large  groups  of  investors  and  the  industry  became  more  heterogeneous.  In  1990, the 
number of hedge funds grew to 610 with an asset value of $38.9 billion. The last couple 
of years, regular fund houses start to offer hedge funds to the general public (Ineichen, 
2002).  
 
Fashion is strongly related to the adoption cycles described in the marketing literature for 
product innovations. Everett M. Rogers (1983) makes a distinction between the stages of 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, and late majority laggards. Rogers associates 
these adopter groups as differing in their value orientations. Innovators are interested to 
try  new  ideas.  Early  adopters  value  the  respect  gained  by others  for their  innovative 
consumer behavior. The early majority is deliberate in the sense that they considered the 
innovation carefully before actually adopting it. The late majority is skeptic, and only 
adopts an innovation after others do. Laggards are conservative or traditional. According 
to the adoption and diffusion model of Rogers, a fashion cycle starts with a small group 
of innovators. The demand for the product is low with 2.5% consumers adopting the        
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product. Successively, other individuals start to emulate the fashion leaders and demand 
for the product is increasing to 16% of the consumers as the fashion cycle progresses. In 
the next phase the number of consumers that buy the product has grown to 48%. This 
phase is called the early majority phase. At a certain time, the number of individuals that 
follows the style reaches a peak. The next 32.5% of the consumers belongs to the late 
majority. Finally, the last group adopting the style is the laggards, which is 16% of the 
consumers. In appendix 5A, table 5A.1 shows the different stages of a fashion cycle for 
internet stocks. It is difficult to recognize when the introduction phase begins, because 
the small group of fashion leaders is difficult to identify. At this stage, the stocks in the 
particular style will be neglected by almost all equity analysts. The emulation phase is 
identified by a growing number of individuals that start to imitate the fashion leaders. In 
this phase, the face-to-face  communication of the individual with friends, family and 
peers is very important. Some analysts will mention the stocks within a certain style and 
start to cover them. The investment media (papers, television, internet) may, if attention 
is given to the style, speed the rate of diffusion. This will lead to the early majority and 
late majority phase, where the general public starts to follow that particular group of 
stocks and where analysts become very optimistic about these stocks. The result is that 
optimism increases, which leads to an inflow in that particular ‘fashion’ style and an 
outflow in the rest of the styles. Furthermore, the increase in optimism can be noticed by 
an increase in volume, turnover and volatility and a decrease in the bid-ask spread. As a 
result the autocorrelation of the returns of that style and the correlation among stocks 
within the particular style increases. The number of mutual funds that start in the style 
and  the  number  of  IPO’s  grow.  Finally,  the  laggards’  phase  shows  a  decrease  in 
optimism, which lead to an outflow of resources and an increase in the bid-ask spread.  
Changes in fashion are related to the consumer adoption process. However, the 
emphasis with fashion is on the social approval of consumption behavior. This social 
approval is also associated with status. Buying fashion goods yields a status increase for 
the owner. However, the more people own the particular good, the smaller the status 
advantage of the particular good gets. Status wears out. Buying fashion goods is risky, 
since it may be difficult for an individual to make a correct assessment over its future 
status. An example of the riskiness of buying fashion stocks is the Internet hype. In the 
Internet bubble, investors tripped over themselves to buy stocks of the next hot internet 
company.  It  did  not  matter  how  much  these  companies  lost  or  how  awkward  the 
operation activities were, if the name of the company included words like ‘internet’ or 
‘.com’ stock price increases were guaranteed. Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) show 
that during the internet hype a corporate name change into dotcom related internet names         
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lead to positive announcement returns on the order of 74% in the ten days surrounding 
the  announcement.  However,  the  E-commerce  was  still  in  its  infancy  and  had  not 
developed very much. In 1998, the internet industry was characterized by red marks, 
which would have made traditional companies desperate, but investors seemed not to 
care.  For example, Amazon.com made a loss of $125 million, but the market price of the 
shares became worth almost 18 times as much in 1.5 years time. From this example we 
can conclude that risk is not only in terms of losing money but also in terms of losing 
status. Investors are not only concerned about the final result, but also about what other 
people might think when they do not invest in such companies. It seems that the need of 
identity and the social network are just as well important determinants leading investment 
decisions. 
 
A  large  part  of  the  investment  literature  is  based  on  herding,  bubbles  and  fads.  For 
example, Wermers (1999) investigates the degree in which portfolio managers of mutual 
funds herd in their trades. This study suggests that herding can result from momentum-
following (e.g. buying past winners) or repeating the predominant buy or sell pattern 
from  previous  period.  While  this  study  tests  whether  ‘too  many’  portfolio  managers 
appear to make the same choices, it does not directly test the social interaction between 
portfolio managers. Why do people herd? Fashion could be an additional explanation that 
clarifies phenomena such as overreaction and underreaction, herding, momentum, etc.  
The term fashion covers the three terms: bubbles, herding and fads. For example, bubbles 
and herding are part of the fashion cycle. Bubbles may start in the third stage of the 
fashion cycle when the mass starts to adopt the new style. Welch (2000) defines herding 
as behavior patterns that are correlated across individuals, which can lead to sub-optimal 
choices  in  the  decision-making  process.  Many  researchers  examine  the  existence  of 
herding in stock markets, but these studies neglect to explain the origin of herding. Reed 
(1992) compares fads with fashions. The difference between fashions and fads is that a 
fad has a rapid growth, which sinks into a rapid decline before it ever achieves maturity. 
In contrast, fashion has a slower growth phase and an observable period of maturity. A 
fad is a product, which satisfies the single utility of new experience. A fashion is more 
complex  in  the  way  that  it  satisfies  a  group  with  related  desires.  Fashions  are  not 
restricted to essential attributes of the product’s design, but are subject to modifications. 
The  effect is that  fashions  are  not  independent  and  isolated,  but  are  consecutive  and 
overlapping. The individual lifecycles of different fashions may be aggregated to one 
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life-cycle for the main product. For example, a mutual fund is the main product, which 
has several modifications based on different styles (internet fund, financial fund, etc.).  
The analysis of stock markets in terms of fashion is a valuable addition to the 
behavioral finance theory. Most of the behavioral finance has focused on the investor’s 
cognition and emotions. For example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) develop a 
model based on the representativeness and conservatism heuristics. It explains the over- 
and  underreaction  of  investors  to  new  information.  Daniel,  Hirshleifer  and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) develop a model that is based on investor overconfidence and 
self-attribution. Their model intends to explain over –and underreaction of stock market 
prices. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) describe investment styles in terms of cycles, where 
the origin of the cycle is explained with the representativeness heuristic. In the literature 
of behavioral finance, social interactions have been (until recently) mostly ignored. To 
describe  the  investment  process  social  interactions  may  be  an  important  aspect  to 
analyze, because social interactions may affect the investor’s emotions and biases, and in 
doing so also investment decisions.  
It is difficult to describe the stock market in terms of fashion (cycles), because it 
is complex to measure the interaction between investors in a social network directly. 
Without data on social interaction, it is not possible to investigate whether the preferences 
of individual investors change in the direction of the preferences of friends, families and 
relatives. Because the aim of this chapter is to investigate to what extent popularity can 
be attributed to style investing, the focus will be on collective preferences of investors 
rather than investigating social interaction directly. Since fashion is closely related to 
popularity in the way that it both reflects the collective preferences of individuals and the 
changes  of  such  preferences  over  time,  in  the  next  sections,  we  will  concentrate  on 
variables that measure popularity. 
 
3  Measures of style investing and style popularity 
 
In the previous sections, we discussed style investing and its association with fashion 
cycles.  In  this  section,  we will  develop a  testable  model  of style  investing  and  style 
popularity based on our previous discussion. The main focus is to measure to what extent 
the popularity can be attributed to style investing or to individual stocks in a particular 
style.  
Following Barberis and Shleifer (2003), we define a style as a group of stocks that 
is  classified  based  on  a  common  characteristic.  The  process  where  investors  allocate 
funds  among  groups  of  stocks  rather  than among  individual  securities  is  called  style  
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investing. This definition of style investing has a number of empirical predictions. When 
investors apply style investing they will not distinguish between stocks within a style. It 
may appear that fundamentally unrelated stocks are grouped in the same category, which 
leads to demand shocks across all stocks in the style. The demand shock across all stocks 
leads to a higher comovement in prices/returns than implied by their fundamentals. This 
has consequences for the correlation between stocks in the same style and the correlation 
between stocks in different styles. When a style becomes popular, the correlation between 
stocks  in  the  same  style  will  increase.  Furthermore,  fund  inflow  by  one  style  drives 
resources out of competing styles, which leads to negative correlations in prices among 
styles.  In  addition,  the  presence  of  style  switchers  leads  to  positively  autocorrelated 
returns  in  the  short  run  and  negatively  autocorrelated  returns  in  the  long  run.  Good 
performance over the last period relative to other styles pushes the prices up again in the 
next period inducing positive autocorrelation. Eventually, the price is reversed in the long 
run inducing negative autocorrelation. The demand for stocks has also implications for 
the comovement in volumes and turnover ratios. Because stocks in the same style are 
regarded  as  the  same  kind  of  shares,  the  demand  for  these  stocks  will  be  equal. 
Consequently,  when  investors  apply  style  investing,  dispersion  (defined  as  the  cross-
sectional  standard  deviation  of  the  turnover  ratio)  will  decrease.  In  summary,  style 
investing should be reflected in the following measures (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003):  
 
·  autocorrelation of returns; 
·  correlation between stock returns in the same style; 
·  correlation between stock returns in different styles; 
·  cross-sectional standard deviation of the stocks’ turnover ratios (dispersion); 
·  relation between past performance and in- and outflows of mutual funds. 
 
Style popularity is based on collective preferences and social pressure, which influence 
the demand for groups of stocks. This demand-driven approach is potentially very useful 
to describe cycles in the stock market. Both style popularity and style investing are based 
on the demand for groups of stocks. However, the definition of style investing is very 
rigid and makes no distinction between stocks in the same style. Style popularity on the 
other hand may be based on the popularity of some stocks within a style. For example, 
style popularity predicts an increase in correlation between some stocks in the same style 
but this does not necessarily concern the correlations between all stocks in the same style. 
It is even possible to find some negative correlations between stocks in the same style. In 
case the popularity of some stocks in the same style increases, the turnover ratio for each  
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asset in the same style will be different. This leads to higher dispersion. Style investing 
also predicts a positive correlation between the popularity of a style and past returns, 
resulting in in- and outflow of mutual funds. However, the popularity of a style may also 
be the result of other factors than past performance. For example, popularity may occur 
spontaneously or in arbitrary reaction to some widely noted events (Shiller, 2000) 
In the next sections, we want to distinguish between the popularity of particular 
stocks and style investing. As described before, style popularity is based on collective 
preferences and social pressure, which influence the demand for groups of stocks. It is 
difficult  to  test  style  popularity  explicitly,  because  the  relation  between  the  different 
variables can also be explained by increasing positive expectations about the prospects of 
a style’s fundamentals in the future. Nonetheless, we can examine the collective style 
popularity, because if a style is popular, many investors and analysts will own or follow 
the stocks within the style. In the previous paragraph, we listed the measures that reflect 
style  investing.  In  order  to  test  to  what  extent  popularity  can  be  attributed  to  style 
investing, we first have to identify variables that reflect collective preferences for groups 
of stocks. The following aspects are relevant to describe popularity: 
 
# The IPO market is often viewed as a measure of investor enthusiasm. The volume of 
IPOs displays large variations over time. Shiller’s (1990) hypothesis is that IPO markets 
are subject to fads that affect market prices. Ritter (1991) provides evidence concerning 
this  hypothesis  by  showing  a  variation  in  underperformance  year-to-year  across 
industries, with companies that went public in high-volume years faring the worst. This is 
consistent  with  a  scenario  where  firms  go public when  investors  are  (over)optimistic 
about the future potential of certain industries. We take the number of IPOs in a style as a 
measure for popularity.  
 
#  The  mutual  fund  industry  has  grown  over  the  past  two  decades.  Stocks  under 
management have grown from 134.8 billion dollar at the end 1979 to 6.8 trillion dollars 
at the end of 1999 (http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm). This is an increase of 
more than 4900%. The number of mutual funds increased from 276 in 1962 to 15644 in 
1999,  which  is  an  increase  of  approximately  273%  during  this  period.  We  take  the 
number of mutual funds applying a specific style that start in a year as a measure of 
popularity for that particular style. 
 
# Liquidity variables can measure the demand of large groups of investors for particular 
stocks or styles. Baker and Stein (2004) developed a model where an increase in the  
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market  liquidity  such  as  lower  bid-ask  spreads  and  high  turnover  ratio’s,  may  be  an 
indicator for the increase in sentiment in the market. This theory suggests that when the 
participation of irrational investor increases the market will become more liquid, which 
results in an increase in volatility and the turnover ratio and a decrease in the bid-ask 
spread. Ofek and Richardson (2003) illustrate this empirically for the internet industry in 
the period from January 1998 to February 2000. During this period the turnover ratio and 
volatility were extremely high and bid-ask spreads were low. For example, the turnover 
ratio was three times higher for internet companies compared to non-internet companies. 
Based on the model of Baker and Stein and the empirical study of Ofek and Richardson 
we  assume  that  liquidity  may  be  a  proxy  for  the  sentiment  in  the  market.  Because 
irrational investors also drive fashions in the investment industry, liquidity measures may 
be good indicators to describe the popularity of stocks. Examples of liquidity measures 
are volume, turnover ratio, bid-ask spreads, and volatility. In times of mass investment in 
a particular style or market the turnover ratio will be high because the irrational investors 
dominate the rational investors. For the same reason should the turnover ratio be low in 
times when the style is out of fashion.  
 
#  As  described  above,  popularity  is  a  process  of  adopters  and  imitators.  Both  are 
influenced  by  two  means  of  communication:  mouth-to-mouth  and  mass  media.  The 
media  may  speed  the  rate  of  diffusion  of  opinions  among  investors.  Analyst 
recommendations  are  one  of  the  media  channels  in  the  investment  industry.  Style 
attractiveness could be measured in terms of the coverage of analysts and the number of 
analysts’  up-  and  downward  revisions.  The  number  of  analysts’  up-  and  downward 
revisions is a measure for analysts’ sentiment. In the context of style popularity, the ratio 
of up- and downward revisions should vary positively with the style attractiveness. When 
analysts  become  more  optimistic  (pessimistic)  about  a  particular  style  the  number  of 
analysts and the ratio of upward divided by downward revisions will increase (decrease).  
 
In  summary,  number  of  IPO’s  and  the  number  of  mutual  funds  that  start  in  a  year, 
liquidity  and  communication  channels  can  express  style  popularity.  To  distinguish 
between the popularity of particular stocks and style investing, the main focus in the next 
sections will be to test to what extent investors apply style investing. Firstly, we generate 
a popularity index by using the principal component analysis. Secondly, we test with a 
regression analysis whether popularity is based on a style level or on an individual stock 
level. We use the cross-sectional standard deviation of the turnover ratio as proxy for 
style. If a style becomes popular, the dispersion in the turnover ratio will become lower.  
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In addition, we test whether the popularity of investment styles is related to past 
performance. Finally, we make some robustness checks where we first show the 
movement of popularity through time and then test whether the movement in popularity 
of investment styles leads to co-movement in prices/returns.  
 
4  Methodology 
 
In this section we describe the methodology used to test whether popularity of stocks 
takes place on a style or an individual level. The variables that measure style popularity is 
explained in section 4.1 and in section 4.2 the dispersion measure is described. In section 
4.3 we explain the model we use to test whether dispersions are significantly lower than 
average during periods of style popularity.  
 
4.1  Style popularity measures 
   
In section 3 we described different variables that reflect the popularity of investment 
styles  and  stocks.  According  to  our  hypothesis  the  following  variables  measure 
popularity: 
 
·  number of IPOs (NipoX,t); 
·  number of mutual funds that start in a year (NmfX,t); 
·  turnover ratio (TurnX,t); 
·  bid-ask spread (SpreadX,t); 
·  analyst optimism (UpdnX,t); 
·  analyst coverage (AnalystX,t). 
 
The number of IPOs is the number of IPOs in the specific style (X) in period t. The 
number of mutual funds is the number of funds applying the style under consideration 
that start in period t. The turnover ratio is the average daily turnover of all stocks within a 
style and is defined as the volume divided by the number of outstanding shares. The bid-
ask spread is the average of daily spreads in a month for each stock in a style. The spread 
is the difference between the ask and bid price divided by the mid price. To measure style 
popularity among analysts, we use analyst coverage and analyst optimism. For analyst 
optimism, we use the number of upward revisions divided by the number of downward 
revisions for all stocks in style X at time t:  
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where UPX,t is the number of upgrades and DOWNX,t is the number of downgrades for all 
stocks in style X during period t. For each period we express analysts’ coverage as the log 
of the number of different analysts that cover style X at time t.  
With the six variables described above we create the following popularity index: 
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t X Analyst b t X Updn b
t X Spread b t X Turn b t X Nmf b t X Nipo b t X P
,          (2) 
 
where PX,t is the level of popularity for style X for a given period t. The coefficients of the 
popularity  index  are  obtained  using  a  principal  component  analysis.  This  analysis 
composites an index based on variables that capture a common factor (see section 6.1 for 
a further explanation). The unit of time is measured in terms of months. The number of 
mutual funds that start in a period is based on annual data. Therefore, for each month in a 
specific year the number of mutual funds is the same.  
 
4.2  Dispersion measure: stock or style popularity 
 
We follow the same methodology of Christie and Huang (1995) to test to what extent 
stock popularity can be attributed to style investing. We use the dispersion of the turnover 
ratio as proxy for style investing. If all stocks within a style become popular within the 
same period, the turnover ratio of stocks within a style will commove to each other. This 
will lead to a decrease in dispersion of the turnover ratio. The cross standard deviation of 
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where Turni is the observed turnover ratio of stock i and  Turn is the cross-sectional 
average of the n turnovers in a style. sX,t is an indicator of dispersion of stock popularity 
across the style category, i.e. a decrease of sX,t means more “uniform” popularity. 
 
4.3  Regression model 
 
With  the  following  regression  we  want  to  test  to  what  extent  investors  apply  style 
investing.  During  abnormal  levels  of  popularity,  style  investing  is  likely  to  be  more 
pronounced. Specifically, style investing suggests that securities (belonging to that style) 
do not differ in their sensitivity to popularity and therefore it predicts that periods of high 
popularity induce decreased levels of dispersion. In contrast style popularity translates 
into an increased level of dispersion. To differentiate between the two hypothesis, we 
isolate the level of dispersion, sX,t , in the extreme tail of the distribution of popularity 
and test whether it differs significantly from the average levels of dispersion that exclude 
the extreme level of popularity. To test the style investing hypothesis we perform the 
following regression: 
 
t X t X t X P b a , , 1 , e s + + = ,                (4) 
 
where PX,t is the extreme level of popularity for style X. We use a dummy for the level of 
extreme popularity (
X p X P s + ). We adopt this criterion for extreme levels of popularity 
because extreme levels of popularity  are arbitrary. The dummy is one if the level of 
popularity in month t lies in the extreme tail of the popularity and zero otherwise. The a 
coefficient denotes the average dispersion of the sample excluding the region covered by 
a dummy variable for extreme levels of popularity. For each variable in this regression 
we determine whether they are stationary. If necessary, we take the first difference of the 
variables in this regression to obtain stationary series. If investors apply style investing, 
an increase in popularity of a style will lead to a lower level of dispersion. This implies 
that  style  investing  predicts  a  significantly  negative  coefficient  for  b1.  If  investors 
differentiate between stocks within the style, an increase in stock popularity will lead to   
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an  increase  in  the  level  of  dispersion.  Therefore,  positive  estimates  for  b1  would  be 
consistent with popularity on an individual stock level.  
 
5  Data  
 
To test whether a style becomes popular we try to find independent measures that can be 
used  to  label  a  style  or  sector.  Examples  of  style  dimensions  are  value/growth, 
small/large capitalization, industries and global regions. We have chosen to study eleven 
different industries. We have not chosen to study value and growth styles, because value 
and growth are defined using market variables. The stocks that are labeled as growth in 
one year will not necessarily be growth stocks in the next year. Styles based on industries 
or countries do not experience such difficulties, because for example a technology stock 
is labeled as technology and continues to be a technology stock in future, unless the 
nature of the firms operations changes due to acquisitions. We sort stocks into industries 
based  on  SIC  codes using the  12  industry  portfolio  classification form  French’s data 
library on the internet
1. We use the list composed by Morgan Stanley
2 with pure internet-
related companies to form an internet portfolio.  
In our study, we include all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for the period 
1982  to  2004.  Real  estate  investment  trusts  (REITs),  American  Depository  Receipts 
(ADRs), closed end mutual funds, foreign stocks, unit investment trusts and Americus 
trusts are excluded from our sample. We use the returns of the CRSP database and the 
accounting data of COMPUSTAT. We use CRSP to collect daily bid and ask prices and 
monthly data for SIC codes, market capitalization, returns, and volume trading. We use 
I/B/E/S to obtain the number of up- and downward revisions and the number of analysts 
that  cover  a  particular  style.  We  take  the  number  of  IPOs  in  a  given  month  from 
Bloomberg.  
The mutual fund data is extracted from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual 
Fund Database. There are two different types of style-related objective codes in the CRSP 
database  for the  post-1991  period:  the  ICDI  Fund Objective  Codes  and  the  Strategic 
Insight Objective Codes. We selected funds that only invest in US stocks. Each fund must 
have at least 70% of common stocks. For each industry we found mutual funds that invest 
in  equity  shares  of  companies  engaged  in  that  particular  industry.  For  the  health, 
financial, technology, energy and utility industry mutual funds exist that explicitly invest 
                                                 
1 http://www.mba.tuck.darthmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
2 http://www.morganstanley.com/institutional/research/research_reports.html?page=research).   
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in  stocks  of  that  particular  industry.  For  the  manufacturing,  retail,  chemicals  and 
consumer (non-)durable good industries we use the ICDI and SI objective codes. Because 
both the ICDI and SI objective codes do not distinguish between internet telecom and 
technology, we subdivide the mutual funds with the objective technology into internet, 
telecom and technology. We subdivide funds into name-based categories, which is in line 
with the idea that investors base there asset allocation on categories to make the choice 
easier. We assume that investors infer from the name of a mutual fund the objective of 
the  mutual  fund.  Mutual funds  with  the  following  words  in the  name  are defined  as 
internet funds: Internet, NetNet, Wireless and www. For telecom funds we use the word 
telecommunication. We use the internet to verify whether the objective of each fund is in 
line with the labels we chose.  
 
6   Results 
 
In section 3 and 4 we described a couple measures that reflect popularity. Table 1 shows 
some descriptive statistics over the period 1983 to 2004. The sample contains 276 months 
(N). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1983-2004) 
N is the number of months that is included in our sample. Nipot is the number of IPO’s in a month. Nmft is the average 
number of mutual funds that start in a month. Turnt-1 is the log of the turnover ratio.  Spreadt-1 is the average bid-ask 
spread. Updnt-1 is the number of upward revisions against the number of downward revisions and analystst is the log of 
number of analysts that cover the market in a month. 
  N  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Nipo t  276  13  12 
Nmf t  276  66  81 
Turn t-1 (log)  276  0.894  0.204 
Spread t-1  276  5.955  1.343 
Updn t-1  276  0.767  0.325 
Analystst  (log)  276  3.125  0.100 
 
The number of IPOs is the number of IPOs in the respective sectors or styles in a month. 
The average number of IPOs in a month during this period was 13. The average number 
of mutual funds that started in a month was 66. The bid-ask spread is the average of daily 
spreads in a month for each stock in a style.  The spread is the difference of the bid- and 
ask price divided by the mid price. The average bid-ask spread is 5.96%. The turnover 
ratio is the average monthly turnover and is defined as the volume divided by the number 
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of outstanding shares. The average monthly turnover (log) was 0.89.The average number 
of analysts per stock on the US stock market during 1983 and 2003 was 3.125. 
Table 2 shows the monthly summary statistics for every industry over the period 
January 1983 to December 2004. The average turnover ratio is 1.157 for the business 
sector and 0.933 for the health sector. The average number of mutual funds that start in 
the  business  sector  is  18  compared  to  55  for  the  health  sector.  Also  the  number  of 
analysts that cover both sectors is high. Utility and the chemical sector were not very 
popular  during  this  period.  The  turnover  was  the  lowest  with  0.731  and  0.162, 
respectively. Furthermore, the number of IPOs was on average zero and the number of 
analysts that covered the sectors was the lowest. In the next section we test whether 
popularity  is  focused  on  a  style  or  individual  stock  level.  Before  we  test  the  style 
investing hypothesis, we first present our findings for the  average popularity of each 
investment style.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive popularity statistics for each sector over the period 1983 to 
2004 
N is the number of months that is included in our sample. Nipot is the number of IPO’s in a month. Nmft is the average 
number of mutual funds that start in a month. Turnt-1 is the log of the turnover ratio.  Spreadt-1 is the average bid-ask 
spread. Updnt-1 is the number of upward revisions against the number of downward revisions and analystst is the log of 
number of analysts that cover the market in a month. Pt is the average standardized popularity. The average popularity 
for the Internet sector is over the period 1993 to 2004. 
Industries  IPOt  Nmft  Turn t-1  Spread t-1  Updnt-1  Analystst  Pt 
Manufacturing  0  0  1.871  5.233  74.612  5.944  0.358 
Consumer durables  0  0  1.881  5.015  86.119  4.799  0.378 
Consumer non durables  1  1  1.863  5.026  76.713  5.312  0.437 
Financials  2  6  1.622  4.703  94.167  5.731  0.459 
Health  3  55  2.352  7.049  84.871  5.392  0.436 
Telecom  1  1  2.181  5.863  75.807  4.774  0.413 
Utility  0  8  1.487  2.133  91.152  4.597  0.375 
Business  3  18  2.513  7.398  82.043  6.241  0.410 
Wholesale   0  0  1.854  4.867  81.479  5.882  0.443 
Chemicals  2  1  2.134  6.016  84.666  4.752  0.299 
Energy  1  6  1.799  8.671  108.942  4.898  0.461 
Internet  3  5  3.429  6.975  315.714  1.368  0.682 
 
6.1  Popularity index 
 
Following the procedure of section 4.1 the level of popularity is created by making an 
index of the different popularity measures described in section 3. The procedure is as 
follows. The model is estimated by using first principal component analysis. The first  
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principal component of the six variables with their lags is estimated
3. This gives a first-
stage index with twelve loadings, one for each of the current and lagged variables. We 
then compute the popularity index with six variables, lead or lag, based on the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure (the one which gives the highest value). This leads to the following 
the coefficients of our popularity index (cf. section 4.1): 
 
t X Analyst t X Updn
t X Spread t X Turn t X Nmf t X Nipo t X P
, 286 . 0 1 , 211 . 0              
1 , 212 . 0 1 , 295 . 0 , 234 . 0 , 110 . 0 ,
+ -
+ - - - + + =
,        (5) 
 
where Nipot is the number of IPO’s in a month, Nmft is the number of mutual funds that 
start in a year, Turnt-1 is the log of the monthly turnover ratio, Spreadt-1 is the average 
monthly  bid-ask  spread,  Updnt-1  is  the  number  of  upward  revisions  divided  by  the 
number of downward revisions in the given month for all stocks in style X and Analystt is 
the log of number of analysts that cover a sector in a particular month. Table4 presents 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure, which is 0.710, meaning that the principal component 
analysis gives useful results (if the value is above 0.60, the factors extracted will account 
for  a  fare  amount  of  variance).  Moreover,  Bartlett’s  test  of  sphericity  is  significant, 
indicating a good fit. This is confirmed by the correlation matrix in table 3, which shows 
that most of the correlations between the variables are statistically significant at a 1% 
level.  Table  5  shows  that  the  first  principal  component  explains  51.3%  of  the 
standardized  sample  variance,  and  only  the  first  eigenvalue  is  above  1.00.  Figure  1 
confirms that only one factor captures the common variance. The correlation between the 
twelve-term  first  stage  index  and  the  Popularity  index  is  0.99,  suggesting  that  little 
information is lost in dropping six terms.  
 
                                                 
3 Other variables such as inflow and outflow of mutual funds and number of stopped analysts reduced the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure.  
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Table 3: Correlation scheme for variables 
  NIPOt  Nmft-1  Turnt-1  Spreadt-1  Analystst  Updnt-1  Pt 
NIPO t  1             
Nmf t  .208(**)  1           
Turnover t-1 (log)  .304(**)  .609(**)  1         
Spread t-1  -.229(**)  -.154(**)  -.550(**)  1       
Analystst (log)  .170  .613(**)  .812(**)  -.470(**)  1     
Updn t-1  .0.07(*)  .364(**)  .414(**)  -.386(**)  .487(**)  1   
Pt  .338(**)  .721(**)  .907(**)  -.651(**)  .880(**)  .650(**)  1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
   
Table 4: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure and Bartlett's Test of sphericity 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure tests whether the partial correlations among variables is small. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
tests whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix which would indicate that the factor model is inappropriate. 
The df is the number of degrees of freedom and Sig. is the probability value which measures whether the value is 
statistically significant. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy.  .710 
Bartlett' s Test of 
Sphericity  Approx. Chi-Square  684.090 
  df  15 
  Sig.  .000 
 
 
Figure 1: Scree plot 
A scree plot is a graphical method where the eigenvalues are plotted against the component number. 
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Table 5:  Total Variance Explained 
This table presents the results form the principal component analysis. The variances extracted by the factors are called 
the eigenvalues. The first column (Total) contains the Eigenvalues. It shows the total variance that is extracted by each 
factor. The second column (% of Variance) contains the percent of total variance accounted for by each factor. The 
third column (Cumulative %) contains the cumulative variance extracted for the current and preceding factors.  
Component  Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
   Total 
% of 
Variance  Cumulative %  Total 
% of 
Variance  Cumulative % 
1  3.077  51.287  51.287  3.077  51.287  51.287 
2  .989  16.477  67.764       
3  .858  14.294  82.058       
4  .635  10.579  92.637       
5  .293  4.888  97.525       
6  .148  2.475  100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
The coefficients in equation 5 are intuitively appealing. Firstly, the variables have the 
expected sign. As expected, the variables (except for bid-ask spreads) show a positive 
relation with popularity. As one of these variables increases, the level of popularity tends 
to increase as well. If the level of popularity of a style or stock increases, the bid-ask 
spread will also decrease. Secondly, the proxies enter with the expected timing. Investor 
behavior such as liquidity leads to firm supply variables. More generally, proxies that 
involve firm supply responses (Nipot and Nmft) are likely to lag proxies that are based on 
investor demand (Spreadt-1 and Turnt-1). In addition, the timing of the variable Updnt-1 
and Analystt suggests that a fraction of analysts have to become optimistic before more 
analysts start to cover a sector or stock.  
The coefficients obtained from this model are used to calculate a popularity index 
for each individual sector. For each sector the obtained popularity index will be regressed 
against the dispersion variable. 
 
6.2  Popularity at a style or stock level 
 
Using equation 5, we obtain a popularity index for each sector. Table 5 (column right-
hand side) shows the average monthly popularity index for every industry over the period 
January 1983 to December 2004. The average popularity is the highest for the financial 
and  internet  sector  with  0.459  and  0.682,  respectively.  The  manufacturing  and  the 
chemical sector have the lowest average popularity with 0.358 and 0.299, respectively. 
These values conceal the cyclical nature of popularity (which can be compared to the 
fashion cycles mentioned in section 2). In section 7.1, we will further investigate the 
movement in popularity for each sector through time.  
  21 
When investors apply style investing there should be a negative relation between style 
popularity and the cross standard deviation of the turnover ratios. The turnover ratios of 
all stocks in the same style should comove, which lead to a decrease in the standard 
deviation of the stocks’ turnover ratios. Table 6 provides the average level of turnover 
dispersion for each sector. The average level of turnover dispersion is 17.9 percent a 
month across all stocks. Across the industries, the level of turnover dispersion ranges 
from a low of 4.0 percent for utilities to 19 percent for business sector in the period 1983 
to 2004. Although, we show averages for popularity and dispersion, it seems that there is 
a positive relation between style popularity and dispersion.  
 
Table 6: Dispersion in turnover ratios over period 1983 to 2004 
Dispersion is the cross standard deviation of the turnover ratio. The average dispersion for the Internet sector is over the 
period 1993 to 2004. 
Industries  Dispersion 
All stocks  17.900 
Manufacturing  11.412 
Consumer durables  8.038 
Consumer non durables  9.741 
Financials  9.180 
Health  15.039 
Telecom  15.152 
Utility  3.981 
Business  19.340 
Wholesale  14.082 
Chemicals  8.084 
Energy  8.859 
Internet  35.075 
 
Equation  4  was  estimated  using  the  coefficients  obtained  from  the  first  principal 
component  analysis  (equation  5).  Table  7  provides  the  regression  estimates  across 
industries  over  the  period  1983  to  2004.  Under  the  dispersion  in  turnover  ratio  as  a 
dependent  variable,  the  coefficient  estimates  are  reliable  and  uniformly  positive. 
Therefore, the popularity of stocks cannot be attributed to style investing. The sectors 
financials  and  energy,  which  have  the  highest  popularity  during  this  period,  exhibit 
positive  coefficients.  The  business  sector  has  the  highest  average  dispersion  after 
excluding the region by the dummy variable (as indicated by the constant). The utility 
sector exhibits the lowest dispersion during this period and has a very low coefficient. 
The  results  show  that  the  popular  sectors  have  the  highest  dispersion  and  positive 
coefficients. This suggests that popularity is on an individual stock level instead of a style 
level.  
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Table 7:  Regression  analysis  with  as  independent  variable  dispersion  in 
turnover over period 1983 to 2004 
The independent variable is a dummy for extreme movements in popularity. If necessary, we take the first difference of 
the variables to obtain stationary series. It is one when the value is above mean+standard deviation and otherwise zero. 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the turnover ratio. The detrended levels are obtained by taking the 
first difference. Newey-west is used to adjust the t-statistics for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Industries  constant  b1  t(constant)  t(b1)  adj. R
2 
Manufacturing  0.098  0.081  13.952  2.596  0.100 
Consumer durables  0.077  0.027  21.319  3.838  0.056 
Consumer non durables   0.090  0.063  16.525  3.873  0.116 
Financials  0.083  0.049  9.093  2.330  0.024 
Health  0.135  0.093  14.195  5.097  0.103 
Telecom  0.112  0.223  13.001  3.611  0.165 
Utility   0.039  0.014  19.138  3.417  0.062 
Business  0.168  0.199  12.354  5.891  0.171 
Wholesale  0.118  0.145  11.777  3.822  0.113 
Chemicals  0.078  0.014  19.639  1.519  0.019 
Energy  0.080  0.045  8.068  4.407  0.026 
  Detrended levels 
Financials  0.084  0.042  13.196  1.174  0.018 
Health  0.148  0.028  12.806  2.243  0.006 
Business  0.194  0.039  9.749  2.002  0.006 
Energy  0.086  0.015  9.039  1.630  0.002 
 
To show that the results are not dependent on the period we chose, we also perform 
regressions  over  the  period  1992  to  2004.  Table  8  presents  the  outcomes  of  the 
regression. The results are consistent with the results of table 7. The coefficient estimate 
for the internet sector is negative, which implies that the popularity can be attributed to 
style  investing.  However,  the  heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-statistics  shows  that  this 
result is not reliable.  
When we use the full sample period, we find that the popularity index shows non 
stationary series for the financial, health, business and energy sector. When we either 
restrict the sample period to the 1992-2004 period or detrend the data, the relationship 
between the level of (detrended) popularity and the level of dispersion is still positive. 
Although  the  coefficients  are  still  positive  and  the  two  out  of  four  coefficients  are 
statistically significant, detrending makes a considerable difference in the explanatory 
power. The adjusted R-squares of these regressions range from 0.002 to 0.018, which is 
lower than the adjusted R-squares of the regressions without detrending, which ranges 
from 0.024 to 0.171.  
 
To summarize, our findings show that the level of dispersion is high when popular is 
high,  which  indicates  that  popularity  is  stock  specific  and  not  style-specific. 
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Table 8:  Regression  analysis  with  as  independent  variable  dispersion  in 
turnover over the period 1992 to 2004 
The independent variable is a dummy for extreme movements in popularity. If necessary we take the first difference of 
the variables to obtain stationary series. It is one when the value is above mean+standard deviation and otherwise zero. 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the turnover ratio. Newey-west is used to adjust the t-statistics for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Industries:  constant  b1  t(constant)  t(b1)  adj. R
2 
Manufacturing  0.131  0.074  13.221  2.190  0.084 
Consumer durables  0.088  0.018  18.951  2.393  0.035 
Consumer non durables   0.116  0.038  14.927  2.218  0.051 
Financials  0.088  0.044  23.902  2.296  0.121 
Health  0.180  0.048  12.631  2.599  0.032 
Telecom  0.166  0.169  15.679  2.730  0.092 
Utility   0.041  0.010  12.983  2.425  0.038 
Business  0.246  0.121  13.474  3.779  0.079 
Wholesale  0.164  0.099  10.178  2.511  0.053 
Chemicals  0.093  0.000  17.907  0.014  0.000 
Energy  0.113  0.012  6.318  0.714  0.002 
Internet  0.369  -0.080  14.115  1.389  0.015 
 
To detect size-effects in the dispersion of stocks within a style, we divide stocks into 
quintiles and run the regression again for each size-group within the sectors. Table 9 
show the effect of size conditional on dispersion. We find a size-effect for most of the 
less popular industries. Sectors like consumer durables, chemicals, and utility show from 
small-size to the large-size a pattern of decreasing coefficients. When one of these sectors 
becomes more popular, the demand for large caps will increase. This results in a lower 
dispersion in turnover. For the popular sectors, financials and health, we cannot find size-
effects. If one of these styles is popular, dispersion will be high independent of size. For 
the internet sector, we perform the regression over the period 1998 to 2004. The reason is 
that the internet sector has its origin in 1992 and, therefore, has a small number of stocks 
over the period 1992 to 1997. The results for the internet sector show from small-size to 
the  large-size  a  pattern  of  increasing  coefficients.  This  implies  that  when  this  sector 
becomes more popular, the demand for small caps increases, resulting in a lower level of 
dispersion. The low number of stocks in some of the quintiles may influence the results in 
the way that one stock may have a larger impact on the outcome. Therefore, we also 
divide stocks into three size portfolios (30%-40%-30%) and perform the same regression. 
We find similar results as is shown in table 9. 
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Table 9: regression analysis: industries divided into size quintiles over period 1983 
to 2004 
For each sector we form quintiles on market capitalization. Market capitalization is calculated at the end of each year 
and equals the number of shares outstanding times its market price. The independent variable is a dummy for extreme 
movements  in  popularity.  It  is  one  when  the  value  is  above  mean+standard  deviation  and  otherwise  zero.  The 
dependent variable is the standard deviation  of  the turnover  ratio.  In panel B, we take  the first difference of the 
variables to obtain stationary series. For the internet sector, we perform the regression over the period 1998 to 2004. 
Number  is  the  average  number  of  stocks  in  each  size  portfolio.  Newey-west  is  used  to  adjust  the  t-statistics  for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Panel A: Levels 
Industries:    number  constant  b1  t(constant)  t(b1)  adj. R
2 
small  317  0.087  0.051  11.534  2.289  0.037 
s2  91  0.090  0.045  17.748  3.732  0.119 
s3  56  0.115  0.183  10.089  2.122  0.119 
s4  48  0.078  0.042  12.094  3.452  0.080 
Manufacturing 
large  32  0.076  0.025  10.776  2.445  0.025 
small  40  0.074  0.023  20.428  2.499  0.037 
s2  8  0.070  0.031  11.912  2.128  0.033 
s3  5  0.058  0.020  9.002  1.576  0.007 
s4  4  0.040  -0.011  9.361  -2.116  0.008 
Consumer durables  
large  4  0.035  0.006  15.766  1.741  0.013 
small  167  0.086  0.087  13.426  3.715  0.135 
s2  39  0.099  0.018  15.237  1.408  0.012 
s3  31  0.073  0.028  20.612  3.730  0.077 
s4  24  0.055  0.010  22.723  2.233  0.027 
Consumer non durables 
large  28  0.037  0.009  16.267  1.875  0.024 
small  526  0.082  0.045  6.530  1.894  0.011 
s2  131  0.077  0.058  20.867  2.061  0.113 
s3  81  0.070  0.050  19.430  3.502  0.147 
s4  66  0.072  0.062  13.982  5.310  0.171 
Financials 
large  57  0.050  0.024  23.410  2.174  0.099 
small  269  0.127  0.093  11.906  3.596  0.068 
s2  57  0.138  0.067  13.965  3.962  0.080 
s3  29  0.140  0.041  18.546  2.446  0.045 
s4  20  0.118  0.088  13.001  4.157  0.145 
Health  
large  24  0.070  0.031  12.580  2.162  0.055 
small  35  0.127  0.093  11.906  3.596  0.068 
s2  15  0.138  0.067  13.965  3.962  0.080 
s3  14  0.140  0.041  18.546  2.446  0.045 
s4  13  0.118  0.088  13.001  4.157  0.145 
Telecom 
large  21  0.070  0.031  12.580  2.162  0.055 
small  35  0.030  0.010  16.895  1.520  0.026 
s2  28  0.031  0.013  14.409  2.099  0.030 
s3  35  0.035  0.018  15.198  2.204  0.048 
s4  38  0.039  0.005  16.043  0.979  0.005 
Utility  
large  31  0.028  0.000  11.552  -0.050  0.000  
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small  493  0.135  0.205  11.214  5.143  0.175 
s2  98  0.163  0.118  15.519  5.031  0.177 
s3  58  0.187  0.098  17.501  5.151  0.137 
s4  42  0.199  0.060  13.209  3.452  0.037 
Business 
large  30  0.159  0.104  13.703  5.389  0.150 
small  310  0.112  0.169  9.505  3.328  0.092 
s2  75  0.111  0.110  15.410  4.154  0.166 
s3  47  0.112  0.096  14.283  3.569  0.102 
s4  39  0.077  0.043  20.255  6.079  0.176 
Wholesale 
large  26  0.055  0.072  10.819  4.493  0.210 
small  47  0.070  0.021  20.871  2.377  0.039 
s2  14  0.069  0.045  16.843  2.267  0.080 
s3  17  0.078  -0.014  9.075  -1.373  0.005 
s4  14  0.069  -0.011  6.880  -0.907  0.003 
Chemicals 
large  14  0.037  -0.004  22.703  -0.853  0.005 
small  117  0.082  0.056  5.494  3.757  0.017 
s2  25  0.070  0.049  17.505  5.339  0.203 
s3  16  0.059  0.044  15.234  6.185  0.169 
s4  16  0.058  0.025  12.136  4.305  0.057 
Energy  
large  19  0.044  0.025  12.146  4.823  0.094 
small  84  0.290  -0.127  5.419  -1.900  0.035 
s2  30  0.281  -0.075  9.768  -2.422  0.036 
s3  20  0.333  -0.089  8.626  -2.253  0.026 
s4  18  0.367  -0.029  7.490  -0.464  0.002 
Internet 
large  11  0.240  0.129  7.678  2.612  0.091 
Panel B: Detrended levels 
small  526  0.089  0.020  7.910  0.724  0.000 
s2  131  0.087  -0.004  12.254  -0.363  0.000 
s3  81  0.079  0.012  16.294  1.332  0.002 
s4  66  0.083  0.012  12.545  0.833  0.001 
Financials 
large  57  0.054  -0.002  17.196  -0.327  0.000 
small  269  0.141  0.087  11.817  1.809  0.012 
s2  57  0.149  0.030  15.876  1.227  0.003 
s3  29  0.146  0.046  21.116  1.712  0.012 
s4  20  0.132  0.052  13.766  1.911  0.010 
Health 
large  24  0.074  0.037  13.245  1.987  0.016 
small  493  0.166  0.088  9.557  1.702  0.005 
s2  98  0.180  0.104  16.040  4.620  0.019 
s3  58  0.201  0.144  19.346  2.540  0.041 
s4  42  0.208  0.077  15.532  3.820  0.009 
Business  
large  30  0.175  0.074  15.176  4.633  0.011 
small  117  0.091  0.036  6.698  1.397  0.002 
s2  25  0.078  0.011  17.108  0.922  0.002 
s3  16  0.065  0.052  16.169  1.859  0.052 
s4  16  0.063  0.009  14.209  1.308  0.002 
Energy 
large  19  0.049  0.014  13.658  1.668  0.006  
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As we mention before, the popularity index shows non stationary series for the financial, 
health, business and energy sector. For these sectors, we take the first difference to obtain 
stationary series. Panel B of table 9 shows similar results as panel A, with the exception 
that only for the business sector the coefficients are statistically significant. 
Baker  and  Wurgler  (2004),  show  that  size-effects  exist  in  low-sentiment 
conditions only. They define sentiment as a force that drives the relative demand for 
speculative investments. Investors’ sentiment has strong effects on the cross-section of 
stock prices. If popularity is not related to the style’s fundamentals, popularity will be 
driven by investors’ sentiment. Although we do not know whether popularity is driven by 
investors’ sentiment  or  by fundamentals,  our  findings  show  close  resemblance  to  the 
outcomes of Baker and Wurgler (2004). 
Barberis  and  Shleifer  (2003)  argue  that  an  investment  cycle  starts  after  good 
information in terms of good past performance. Pomorski (2004) show this empirically. 
He finds that flows are positively related to past returns and negatively related to returns 
of competing styles. We want to test the relationship between the change in popularity 
(DPX,t) and past returns. Firstly, we perform the Granger Causality test for each sector to 
test whether both variables, change in popularity and monthly returns, play a role in the 
determination  of  each  other.  The  Granger  probabilities  show  that  there  is  causal 
relationship between the change in popularity and returns for the most popular sectors. 
Specifically, quarterly returns Granger cause popularity (see table 10).  
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Table 10: Granger causality test: quarterly returns and popularity over the period 
1983 to 2004 
For each quarter we calculated returns and the change in popularity. The change in popularity is reflected by DPX,t. The 
significance levels are presented with stars, where ** is 1% and * is 5% significance level. 
Granger causality tests
4  Obs  F-statistic  probability 
Manufacturing 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  16.171**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    0.082  0.921 
Consumer durables 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  19.875**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    1.234  0.297 
Consumer non durables 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  15.030**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    0.282  0.755 
Financials       
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  4.145**  0.019 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    1.591  0.210 
Health 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  24.884**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    3.333  0.041 
Telecom 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  17.773**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    1.839  0.166 
Utility 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  0.731  0.485 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    1.443  0.242 
Business 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  11.701**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    7.091**  0.001 
Wholesale 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  8.753**  0.000 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    0.865  0.425 
Chemicals 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  6.119**  0.003 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    0.016  0.985 
Energy 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    85  3.859**  0.025 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    1.085  0.343 
Internet 
Return does not Granger Cause DPX,t    44  6.522**  0.004 
DPX,t does not Granger Cause Return    3.583*  0.038 
                                                 
4 We include 8 lags for the Granger test. This lag length corresponds to a reasonable belief about the time in 
which past returns could predict popularity.  
  28 
Because the Granger causality runs one-way from past returns to popularity and not the 
other way, we perform a regression to test the relation between the change in popularity 
and past performance: 
 
t t X t X t t X P R c P e b b + D + + = D - - 1 , 2 1 , 1 , ,                        (6) 
 
where DPX,t-1  is the change in quarterly popularity and RX,t-1 is the quarterly return for 
style X at time t-1. With equation 6 we test whether the change in popularity of a style is 
the result of good past performance or popularity. If the change in popularity influences 
the change in popularity in the next period, b2 should be positive implying that there is 
persistence  in  popularity  time  series.  If  the  popularity  of  a  style  depends  on  past 
performance, b1 should be positive. The outcomes of the regression are presented in table 
11.  
 
Table 11:  Regression analysis with as dependent variable popularity over period 
1983 to 2004 
This table shows the results of equation 6. The dependent variable is the change in popularity and the independent 
variables are the past quarterly return and change in past popularity. Newey-west is used to adjust the t-statistics for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Industries:  constant  b1  b2  t(constant)  t(b1)  t(b2)  adj. R
2 
Manufacturing  -0.037  2.069  -0.276  -1.107  6.348  -2.828  0.321 
Consumer durables  -0.034  2.048  -0.370  -0.798  7.853  -3.854  0.313 
Consumer non durables   -0.021  2.175  -0.369  -0.572  7.083  -4.745  0.292 
Financials  -0.022  1.478  -0.518  -0.560  3.145  -6.832  0.248 
Health  -0.041  1.913  -0.431  -1.282  6.112  -5.552  0.367 
Telecom  -0.028  1.535  -0.317  -0.671  5.254  -3.847  0.297 
Utility   0.009  0.640  -0.306  0.247  1.102  -2.922  0.086 
Business  -0.007  1.093  -0.455  -0.182  5.163  -2.945  0.304 
Wholesale  -0.001  1.532  -0.472  -0.025  3.650  -4.258  0.308 
Chemicals  -0.035  1.786  -0.339  -0.827  4.707  -3.826  0.234 
Energy  0.018  0.861  -0.406  0.499  3.321  -5.335  0.194 
Internet  -0.016  0.250  0.062  -0.286  1.387  0.393  0.055 
 
As can be seen from the table, we find that lagged popularity (difference) and lagged 
returns influence current changes in popularity. Past returns seems to have a positive 
influence on popularity independent of the average popularity of a style. This implies that 
changes in popularity are induced by past performance in stock returns. That is, investors 
buy stocks from a style that have performed well in the past. 
These  results  are  consistent  with  Barberis  and  Shleifer  (2003),  who  suggest  that  an 
investment cycle starts with good past performance. These results also fit closely with the 
literature on the positive-feedback trading of institutional investors. Grinblatt, Titman and  
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Wermers (1995) and Carhart (1997) show that institutional investors tend to buy stocks 
that performed well in the past. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that stock popularity cannot be attributed to style investing. 
We show a positive relation between dispersion and extreme levels of style popularity. 
This  means  that  in  periods  of  high  style  popularity,  we  cannot  find  comovement  in 
trading activity within styles. This implies that only a fraction of stocks belonging to that 
style is popular. The fraction of popular stocks may be related to particular size groups. 
We have therefore tested for size-effects, to check whether popularity  is centered on 
particular size groups. For most of the less popular sectors (from small size to the large 
size) we find a decreasing pattern of coefficients. However, most of the coefficients are 
still positive, which points to the existence of popularity at a stock level instead of a style 
level. Finally, we test whether changes in popularity are related to past performance in 
returns and find a positive relation.  
 
7  Robustness analysis 
 
In section 6.2, we present an average popularity score for each sector over the period 
1983 to 2004. This is a static value, which does not show the life cycles of popularity 
(which can be compared to the fashion cycles mentioned in section 2) and the movement 
in popularity through time. In section 7.1, we present the cyclical nature of popularity for 
each sector. 
The  empirical  analysis  in  section  6.2  shows  evidence  inconsistent  with  the 
predictions of style investing theory. A possible alternative explanation for our findings is 
that we investigate the comovement in turnover ratios rather than the comovement in 
prices/returns as is shown by a series of recent studies (Cornell (2004), and Barberis, 
Shleifer and Wurgler (2005)). Another explanation for our findings in section 6.2 is that 
we focus on the extreme level of popularity rather than the change in popularity. Hence, 
to explore whether movements in popularity lead to comovement in returns, we test the 
impact  of  the  change  in  popularity  on  the  comovement  in  returns  for  each  sector  in 
section 7.2. 
 
7.1  Movement in popularity 
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Barberis and Shleifer (2003) describe style investing in terms of life-cycles. The birth of 
a style starts after good fundamental news about the securities in a style. If the style 
matures, good past performance in style returns is important to add new resources to a 
style. The style loses its popularity when bad news arrives or when arbitrage levels out 
excess returns. After a while, the cycle may start all over again. In this section, we show 
the  movement  in  style  popularity  through  time.  Before  we  show  the  movement  in 
popularity through time for the eleven different industries, we first present the movement 
in popularity for the internet sector. In appendix A we describe the internet sector in 
terms of a popularity cycle. The popularity cycle is divided into different stages based on 
the  model  of  E.  Rogers  (1983).  In  appendix  A  we  present  a  further  outline  of  the 
procedure  followed.  Table  A.3 shows  the  different  stages  of  the  popularity  cycle  for 
internet sector with the corresponding popularity. Popularity shows a low value in the 
leader stage and reaches a peak in the late majority stage. The right-hand column in table 
A.3 shows that dispersion reaches its peak in the early majority phase. This implies a 
positive relation between dispersion and popularity.  
In order to show the movement in popularity for the other eleven sectors, we 
calculate a 2.5-year rolling average popularity. Figure 2 shows that popularity of sectors 
is  changing  through  time.  For  example,  the  popularity  of  the  business  sector  was 
relatively low during the eighties and started to increase in the nineties. On the other 
hand, the popularity of the utility sector was relatively high over the period 1988 to 1993 
and declined after 1994. We also calculate the 2.5-year rolling average dispersion. Figure 
2 shows that dispersion moves in a similar way as popularity. For the business sector 
dispersion shows an increasing pattern, while dispersion for the utility sector shows a 
decreasing pattern in the mid-nineties. 
  
  31 
Figure 2: The 2.5-year rolling average popularity and the 2.5-year rolling average 
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Table 12 presents the average popularity for four different periods. The numbers confirm 
our analysis of figure 2. The utility sector is popular during the eighties and becomes less 
popular in the nineties. Other sectors, like business and energy, are not popular during the 
eighties but increase in popularity during the nineties. Overall, figure 2 and table 12 show 
that  the movement  in  popularity  shows  close  resemblance  with  the  fashion  cycles  as 
described in section 2. 
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Table 12: Average popularity over different horizons  
  Average popularity 
Industries:  1983-1986  1987-1990  1991-1994  1995-1999  2000-2004 
Manufacturing  0.149  -0.493  -0.070  0.733  0.702 
Consumer durables  -0.129  0.077  0.207  0.728  0.373 
Consumer non durables  -0.530  -0.455  0.122  1.047  0.771 
Financials  -0.578  -0.583  -0.204  1.041  1.057 
Health  -0.616  -0.834  0.284  0.978  1.058 
Telecom  -0.461  -0.597  0.045  0.939  0.949 
Utility  -0.150  -0.025  0.706  0.397  0.482 
Business  -0.482  -0.797  -0.040  0.846  1.216 
Wholesale  -0.591  -0.602  0.292  0.908  0.942 
Chemicals  0.194  -0.199  0.313  0.481  0.495 
Energy  -0.807  -0.790  0.129  1.139  1.099 
 
7.2  Popularity and the comovement in prices/returns 
 
In section 7.1, we show the movement in popularity through time. In this section, we 
explore whether the movement in popularity leads to comovement in returns. If investors 
apply style investing, they will not distinguish between stocks within a style. Stocks that 
may be fundamentally unrelated are grouped to the same category, which lead to demand 
shocks across all stocks in the style, resulting in comovement in returns. The correlation 
between returns is a good indicator to distinguish between style popularity and stock 
popularity. If investors apply style investing the returns across all stocks in the style will 
be highly correlated.  
Before we test for the eleven sectors whether the movement in popularity leads to 
comovement in returns, we first analyze the comovement in returns of internet stocks. In 
appendix A, table A.4 shows the average correlations in returns between internet stocks 
for different stages in the cycle. As subperiods we use the different stages of the fashion 
cycle which are defined in appendix A. The internet sector does not show the same high 
correlations in returns as the results of Cornell (2004). The correlation increases slightly 
in the emulation and mass phase, but is even lower than Cornell’s correlation of 30% at 
the end of the boom. Table A.5 in appendix A presents the distribution of the 60-day 
rolling correlation through time over the period 1994 to 2003. We calculate for each sub 
period  and  correlation  group  the  average  and  median  fraction  of  60-day  rolling 
correlation between all pairs of stocks. This table shows that there is a very low fraction 
of stocks that was highly correlated with each other. For 4.5 % of the cases the 60-day 
correlation increases to above 40% in the introduction period, 0.5% in the emulation 
period and 0.4% in the mass phase. We also calculate the 60-day rolling correlations  
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between  Yahoo  and  Amazon  and  calculated  the  average  and  median  (between  the 
brackets) correlation for each sub period. The average correlations were in the emulation 
period 56% (56%) and for the mass phase 66% (70%). Another note that can be made on 
the correlations is that fifty percent of the stocks are negatively or not (0%) related with 
each other (in all five phases). Comparing these results with the results of Cornell (2004) 
we believe that the results of Cornell are a result of chance instead of evidence for the 
style  investing  hypothesis.  He  chose  just  those  two  internet  stocks  that  show  high 
comovement in returns. An explanation for the results found by Cornell may be stock 
popularity. Both stocks, Yahoo and Amazon, could have been popular during this period.  
In order to test for comovement in returns for the other eleven industries, we 
perform the following regression: 
 
t t X t t X P a corr e b + D + = D , 1 , ,                               (7) 
 
where DcorrX,t is the change in percentages of correlations between daily returns in a 
quarter that fall between –0.20 and 0.20 and DPX,t is the change in popularity. Table 13 
provides the estimates of the coefficient across industries. The third row contains the 
estimates of b1 and shows that the coefficients are uniformly positive. This implies that 
correlation between returns is decreasing when a style shows an increase in popularity, 
although,  the  heteroskedasticity  consistent  t-statistics  show  that  the  results  are  not 
reliable.  
In summary, using the comovement in returns rather than the comovement of 
turnover ratios, we find similar results as in section 6.2. Notably, the comovement in 
returns decreases  with  an increase in  popularity.  However,  the  adjusted  R-squares  of 
these regressions range from 0.000 to 0.093, lower than the adjusted R-squares of the 
regressions with comovement in turnover ratios, which, as reported in table 7, ranges 
from 0.024 to 0.171. Nevertheless, the coefficients are uniformly positive, which points 
to the existence of popularity at an individual stock level instead of a style level. Taken 
together the results of 6 and 7, our findings are consistent with the predictions of stock 
popularity  hypothesis  instead  of  the  predictions  of  the  style  investing  hypothesis.      
  34 
 
Table 13:  Regression coefficients: correlation between returns and the change in 
popularity over period 1983 to 2004 
This table shows the results of equation 7, where the dependent variable is the number of stocks that have a correlation 
in returns between –0.20 and 0.20. Correlations are calculated for each quarter over daily returns over the period 1983 
to  2004.  The  independent  variable  is  the  change  in  popularity.  Newey-west  is  used  to  adjust  the  t-statistics  for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Industries:  constant  b1  t(constant)  t(b1)  adj. R
2 
Manufacturing  0.031  0.015  0.128  0.008  0.000 
Consumer durables  -0.229  2.825  -3.555  0.800  0.007 
Consumer non durables   -0.115  3.046  -0.306  1.327  0.020 
Financials  -0.066  2.022  -0.260  1.555  0.017 
Health  -0.113  2.088  -0.411  0.842  0.019 
Telecom  -0.389  10.868  -0.590  3.491  0.093 
Utility   -0.088  5.795  -0.172  1.380  0.025 
Business  0.012  2.627  0.023  1.391  0.039 
Wholesale  0.005  2.019  0.029  0.644  0.006 
Chemicals  -0.175  4.186  -0.371  1.557  0.037 
Energy  0.103  0.740  0.295  0.247  0.001 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
This paper provides evidence that popularity is at an individual stock level instead of a 
style level. Because popularity is closely related to fashion, we discuss fashion in the 
context of investing in section 2. Fashion and popularity are related in the way that they 
both reflect the collective preferences of individuals and the changes of such preferences 
over time. The chapter uses different sources of data, such as data on stocks, mutual 
funds,  IPOs  and  analysts  to  reflect  the  collective  preferences  of  investors.  With  the 
different sources of data we compose a popularity index. The popularity index is obtained 
with principal component analysis. This analysis constructs an index based on variables 
that capture a common factor. We find strong evidence that style popularity cannot be 
attributed to style investing. That is, popularity is stock-specific rather than style-specific. 
Styles that are less popular show size-effects. Investors choose for large caps when a 
style is less popular. Barberis and Shleifer argue that an investment cycle starts after good 
information in terms of good past performance. Our findings show that popularity is 
positively related to past returns. These findings are closely related to the literature on 
positive feedback trading (momentum traders). Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995 and 
1997)  and  Carhart  (1997)  show  that  institutional  investors  tend  to  buy  stocks  that 
performed well in the past. 
Finally, we perform some robustness checks to show the life cycles of popularity 
which can be compared to fashion cycles as is described in section 2. In addition, we 
perform a regression to test whether the change in popularity of a particular style leads to      
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comovement in returns between stocks in that style. Our findings show that an increase in 
popularity leads to a decrease in correlations in returns between stocks in the same style.  
Taken  together,  our  findings  are  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  stock 
popularity  hypothesis  instead  of  the  predictions  of  the  style  investing  hypothesis. 
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Appendix A: Fashion cycle for the internet sector 
 
Everett Rogers developed the diffusion of innovation model to help understand the social 
process through which a change or innovation is accepted. Rogers states that "diffusion is 
the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system." This process has proven effective in a variety of 
situations from deciding on a plan of action in a small social gathering to introducing a 
new product in the market place.  
Rogers suggests that trying to quickly and massively convince a group to adopt a new 
idea usually results in failure. He, therefore, determined that any group could be divided 
into five categories, based on the idea that certain individuals are more accepting of new 
ideas (i.e. are more innovative) and others are less accepting and may never adopt or 
embrace new ideas. The five adopter categories are: innovators, early adopters, early 
majority, late majority and laggards.  
 
Classification of analysts into categories following five segments of individual 
innovativeness by Rogers (1983): 
Innovators: up to 2.5% participants 
Early adaptors: up to 13.5% participants 
Early majority: up to 34% participants 
Late majority: more than 34% participants 
Laggards: less than 16% participants 
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Table A.1: Classification of analysts into categories following five segments of 
individual innovativeness by Rogers (1983) for internet stocks 
  Total number 






Brokers internet sector 
in % of total  number of 
brokers in I/B/E/S 
Fashion cycle 
based on the 
model of 
Rogers 
1992  3  221  1.4%  Innovators 
1993  10  221  4.5% 
1994  14  237  5.9% 
1995  24  253  9.5% 
1996  40  280  14.3% 
Early adopters 
1997  66  336  19.6% 
1998  96  365  26.3% 
1999  136  356  38.2% 
2000  154  341  45.2% 
2001  157  326  48.2% 
Early majority 
2002  154  293  52.6% 
2003  161  380  42.4% 
Late majority 
 
Because the internet sector had its origin in the nineties it was completely new, we 
can express this sector in terms of fashion cycles.  We use the adoption and diffusion 
model of Rogers (1983) to divide the internet cycle in different stages. Table A.2 
presents  the  level  of  popularity  among  investors  reported  by  popularity  measures 
described in section 4.1. Table A.2 shows the different stages of the fashion cycle 
with the corresponding values of the different variables for the internet sector.  
 
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for the internet sector over the period 1993 to 
2003 
The adoption and diffusion model by Rogers (1983) is used to divide the internet period in  different stages. 
Turnover ratio is style volume divided by the style’s number of outstanding shares. Nmft is the number of mutual 
funds that is organized during the period. Avg. Inflow is the average in –and outflow per mutual fund on an annual 
basis. Analyst coverage is the total number of analysts with respect to the total number of analysts in period t that 
follows internet stocks. Nup/Ndown  is ratio with the number of upgrades with respect to the number of downgrades.  
Mutual funds  Analyst 
  
Number 
of IPO' s  Turnover 
Avg. 
bid-ask 





















123  2.533  8.474  26  0.003  18.70%  2.501 
 
The  fashion  cycle  of  internet  stocks  started  in  1992  where  the  first  internet  firm, 
America Online, went public. The first mutual fund that specializes in internet stocks 
started trading in 1996. The number of IPO’s grew to 261 in the early majority phase,  
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which was between 1997 and 1999 and fell to 123 in the period 2000 to 2003. At the 
same time the average percentage of inflow for each mutual fund in a year reached its 
peak with 153.75%. Liquidity increased in the same period, the average turnover ratio 
increased  to  4.0.  The  number  of  analysts  that  cover  internet  stocks  in  the  early 
majority phase is 12% and reaches its peak in the late majority phase with 18.7% of 
all analysts covering the internet sector. The measures that reflect optimism reach 
their peak in the early majority phase.  
Table A.3 presents the average level of return and turnover dispersion for the 
internet sector. The average level of return dispersion grows from 16.5 percent in the 
leaders  phase  to  26  %  in  the  late  majority  phase.  The  standard  deviation  of  the 
turnover ratio across the assets is 17.4% in the leader phase and grows to 52.2% in the 
late  majority phase. This is a positive relation  between dispersion  and  popularity, 
which  implies  that  investors  do  not  choose  stocks  on  a  group  basis  but  on  an 
individual level within the group.  
 
Table  A.3:  Popularity  and  dispersion  for  the  internet  sector  for  the  different 
stages of the fashion cycle  
For each phase we calculated the average standardized popularity and the cross standard deviation of the turnover 
ratio (see equation 3 and 5 in section 4.2 and 6.1).  






1993  Leaders  0  0.174 
1994-1996  Early 
adopters  -0.057  0.298 
1997-1999  Early 
majority  0.521  0.522 
2000-2003  Late 
majority  1.299  0.284 
 
Table A.4 presents the style investing measures, the average correlations in returns 
between stocks and the autocorrelation, for different stages in the cycle. The internet 
sector does not show the same high correlations in returns as the results of Cornell 
shows.  
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Table A.4: Style investing measures 
The autocorrelation with one lag is calculated for the time series of returns of the internet sector. For each pair of 
internet stocks we calculated the correlation and then we calculated the average correlation of all pairs. 
Style investing 





1993  Leaders  -  -0.047 
1994-1996  Early 
adopters 
0.008  0.258 
1997-1999  Early 
majority 
0.013  -0.820 
2000-2003  Late 
majority 
0.011  -0.787 
 
Other sectors already existed for a long time and are difficult to express in terms of 
the five stages used by Rogers. We calculate the different stages of the fashion cycle 
for the other ten sectors. Our findings suggest that all ten sectors were in their early 
and late majority in the nineties.  
 
Table A.5: The average and median (between the brackets) fraction of 60-day 
rolling correlations for each correlation group and phase in the fashion cycle. 
For each pair of stocks we calculated the 60-day rolling correlation. For each phase we calculated the average 
rolling  correlation  for  each  pair  and  then  calculated  the  fraction  of  correlations  that  belongs  to  the  different 
correlation groups. 
The fraction of correlations that belong to each correlation interval 
   <-40%  -40% - -21%  -20%-0%  1-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81%-100% 
Subperiod                 
1994.1-
1997.6 
5.5% 
(5.8%) 
13.8% 
(13.9%) 
31.2% 
(30.9%) 
30.5% 
(29.9%) 
12.7% 
(13.5%) 
3.7% 
(3.4%) 
0.8% 
(0.7%) 
0.1% 
(0.1%) 
1997.7-
1998.6 
0.5% 
(0.3%) 
7.9% 
(7.6%) 
42.0% 
(42.4%) 
40.2% 
(40.4%) 
7.3% 
(7.2%) 
0.4% 
(0.3%) 
0.1% 
(0.0%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
1998.7-
2000.6 
0.3% 
(0.2%) 
5.0% 
(6.1%) 
45.5% 
(44.2%) 
42.4% 
(41.4%) 
4.7% 
(5.7%) 
0.4% 
(0.3%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
2000.7-
2001.6 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
0.9% 
(0.9%) 
51.2% 
(51.2%) 
45.7% 
(45.8%) 
0.6% 
(0.4%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
2001.7-
2003 
0.1% 
(0.1%) 
2.5% 
(2.7%) 
49.2% 
(49.2%) 
44.4% 
(43.8%) 
2.1% 
(2.1%) 
0.1% 
(0.1%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
0.0% 
(0.0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 